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Long Road to Justice: The Illinois Supreme Court,
the Illinois Attorney General, and the Parental Notice
of Abortion Act of 1995
Paul Benjamin Linton*

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 14, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Zbaraz v. Hartigan,1 upheld the constitutionality of the
Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995.2 The Seventh
Circuit's decision brought to a successful end the Illinois General
Assembly's thirty-five year struggle to enact enforceable legislation
requiring the consent of, or notice to, a parent or legal guardian of a
pregnant minor before she undergoes an abortion. Between 1975 and
1995, the General Assembly enacted five different statutes requiring
parental consent, parental consultation, or parental notice. Until now,
those efforts have been thwarted, first, by a series of federal court
decisions holding the statutes invalid on federal constitutional grounds
and, later (and for a much longer period of time), by the failure (or
refusal) of the Supreme Court of Illinois to issue the appropriate rules
necessary to implement those statutes. As a result, Illinois was the only
state in the Midwest not to have an enforceable parental consent or
notice statute in effect.
In Part II, this Article sets forth the history of Illinois's efforts to
enact an enforceable parental consent or notice statute. Then, Part III
analyzes the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal in 1995 to issue the
judicial bypass rule necessary to implement the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995. Part IV details the strategy the author developed
to persuade the court to adopt the necessary rule. Parts V and VI review
and analyze the ensuing federal district court litigation once the
* Special Counsel, Thomas More Society (Chicago, Illinois). B.A. Honors (History), 1971,
J.D., 1974, Loyola University Chicago. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the
Thomas More Society and its President & Chief Counsel, Thomas Brejcha, for their support and
encouragement in the research and writing of this article.
1. 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009).
2. The court's holding is discussed infra Part VII.
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implementing rule (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303A) was adopted in
September 2006. Finally, Part VII summarizes the disposition of the
case on appeal.

II. A HISTORY

OF THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S THIRTY-FrVEYEAR EFFORT TO ENACT AN ENFORCEABLE PARENTAL CONSENT OR
NOTICE STATUTE

Beginning in 1975, the Illinois General Assembly has struggled to
enact an enforceable statute requiring parental consent or notice before
an unemancipated minor may obtain an abortion. Until recently, those
efforts-involving two parental consent statutes, two parental notice
statutes, and a statute requiring parental "consultation"-have been
unsuccessful, struck down on federal constitutional grounds by federal
courts, or derailed by the unwillingness of the Illinois Supreme Court to
promulgate appropriate rules for appeals from judicial bypass hearings.
That history is set forth below.
A. The Illinois Abortion Law of 1975
The first post-Roe Illinois abortion statute, the Illinois Abortion Law
of 1973,3 did not contain a parental consent or notice requirement. But
in 1975 the General Assembly enacted a statute that included, among
other provisions, a parental consent requirement. 4 The statute required
the written consent of one parent (or person in loco parentis) of an
unmarried minor under the age of eighteen before an abortion could be
performed, unless a physician certified that the abortion was "necessary
in order to preserve the life or health of the mother." 5 The statute,
however, contained no mechanism by which a minor could go to court
to obtain an order authorizing her to have an abortion without obtaining
her parent's consent.
A temporary restraining order, blocking enforcement of the statute,
was entered on November 22, 1975. A preliminary injunction entered
on December 2, 1975, and a permanent injunction entered on April 12,
1978 followed. 6 The permanent injunction was issued on the basis of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthoodof

3. Illinois Abortion Law of 1973, Public Act No. 78-225 (effective July 19, 1973) (codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,1 81-11 to 81-19 (1973)).
4. Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, Public Act No. 79-1126, § 3(4) (effective Nov. 20, 1975)
(codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 81-23(4) (Supp. 1976)) (repealed 1980).
5. Id.
1978) (reciting the history of the
6. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1305, 1317 (N.D. Ill.
litigation and issuing a permanent injunction).
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Central Missouri v. Danforth.7 In Danforth, the Court held that the
States could not confer on the parents of a minor an absolute veto power
over her decision to obtain an abortion. 8 Following Danforth, Illinois
conceded that its parental consent statute was unconstitutional. 9 The
statute was later repealed. 10
B. The Illinois Abortion ParentalConsent Act of 1977
In 1977, the General Assembly enacted the Illinois Abortion Parental
Consent Act of 1977.11 This act required the written consent of both
parents (subject to certain exceptions) of an unmarried minor, her
guardian, or other person in loco parentis, before she could obtain an
13
abortion. 12 The act also imposed a forty-eight hour waiting period.
Parental consent was not required if the abortion was "necessary for the
preservation of the life of the mother." 14 If the parental consent could
not be obtained or was refused, the minor could seek court-authorized
consent upon a showing that "the pregnant minor fully understands the
consequences of an abortion to her and her unborn child." 15 Notice of
her parents at their last known address by
the hearing had to be sent to
16
registered or certified mail.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
entered a temporary restraining order on February 2, 1978, one month
after the effective date of the statute, blocking its enforcement.1 7 The
court then entered a preliminary injunction on February 23, 1978,18
followed by a permanent injunction on September 25, 1978, and
November 2, 1978.19 The Seventh Circuit thereafter affirmed the
permanent injunction on the basis of its earlier opinion affirming the

7. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
8. Id. at 72-75.
9. Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1317.
10. Public Act No. 81-1078, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1980) (repealed 1984).
11. Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act, Public Act No. 80-1139 (effective Jan. 1, 1978)
(codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, W 81-51 to 81-55 (Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1995).
12. Id. ch. 38, 81-54(3).
13. Id. ch. 38, 81-54(2).
14. Id. ch. 38, 8 81-54 (last sentence).
15. Id. ch. 38, 81-54 (third to the last paragraph).
16. Id.
17. The history of the litigation is set forth in Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir.
1978).
18. Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. 111.1978), affd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d
1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. Wynn v. Scott, No. 78 C 237 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1978 & Nov. 2, 1978). The history of the
litigation is set forth in Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 194 (7th Cir. 1979).
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preliminary injunction. 20 In the earlier opinion, the court of appeals
held that the consent statute was unconstitutional because, among other
alleged defects, the statute required parents to be notified whenever
their minor daughter sought an abortion or requested a judicial bypass
hearing; the statute did not limit the issues in the bypass hearing to the
minor's maturity and her best interests; the statute did not specify the
procedures to be followed in seeking a judicial bypass; and the statute
did not provide for appointment of counsel for the minor, anonymity
of
21
the minor, or an expedited review of the petition or its denial.
C. Amendment to the Abortion Law of 1975
In 1979, the General Assembly, without amending the Abortion
Parental Consent Act of 1977, amended the parental consent provision
of the 1975 statute,2 2 replacing it with a "parental consultation"
requirement.2 3 This requirement was preliminarily enjoined, 24 and was
later repealed with the enactment of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act
of 1983.25
D. The ParentalNotice of Abortion Act of 1983
In 1983, the General Assembly enacted the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act. 26 This act required "actual notice," defined as "the
giving of notice directly, in person or by telephone," 2 7 to both parents
(subject to certain exceptions) of an unemancipated minor (or an
incompetent person), her guardian, or other person in loco parentis at
least twenty-four hours before the abortion was to be performed.2 8
Notice was not required in the case of a "medical emergency" which
"so complicate[d] the pregnancy as to require an immediate abortion." 2 9
Otherwise, a minor (or incompetent person) could petition the circuit
court to waive notice; the court could waive the notice requirements if it
20. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d at 196, affg Wynn v. Scott, No. 78 C 237 (N.D. Ill.Sept. 25,
1978 & Nov. 2, 1978) (citing Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978)).
21. Wynn, 582 F.2dat 1386-90.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 81-23(4) (Supp. 1976).
23. Public Act No. 81-1078, § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1980) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
81-23.3 (Cum. Supp. 1980)) (repealed 1984). This statute also applied to persons who had been
adjudicated disabled and for whom a guardian had been appointed.
24. This litigation is recounted in Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 775 n.2 (7th Cir. 1980).
25. Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983, Public Act No. 83-890, § 9 (effective Jan. 31,
1984) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch, 38, H 81-61 to 81-70) (repealed 1995).
26. Id.
27. Id. ch. 38, 1 81-63(c) (defining "actual notice").
28. Id. ch. 38, IN81-64(a), (b).
29. Id. ch. 38, T 81-66.
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determined that the minor (or incompetent) was "mature and wellinformed enough to make the decision [to have an abortion] on her
own," or that notification "would not be in the best interests of the

minor or incompetent."30
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
declared the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983 unconstitutional
and permanently enjoined its enforcement in Zbaraz v. Hartigan.31 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that, under the Supreme Court's
then recent decision in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive

33
Health,32 the twenty-four hour waiting period was unconstitutional.
The court of appeals held further, however, that the waiting period was
severable from the remainder of the statute. 34 But with respect to the
remainder of the statute, the court enjoined enforcement of the parental
notice act pending the Illinois Supreme Court's promulgation of rules to
35
assure expeditious and confidential proceedings at trial and on appeal.
The Illinois Supreme Court thereafter promulgated a rule for judicial
bypass hearings and appeals, 36 which was found invalid by the district
court in Zbaraz v. Hartigan,37 because the rule did not provide for an ex
parte, confidential proceeding at trial or on appeal. 38

30. Id. ch. 38, IT 81-65(d)(i), (ii).
1984), aff d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 763
31. 584 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I11.
F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affid by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 171 (1987). The
affirmance of a lower court decision by an equally divided Supreme Court is not a precedent of
the Court and may not be cited as binding authority.
32. 462 U.S. 416, 449-51 (1983). That holding was overruled in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992).
33. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1535-39.
34. Id. at 1545.
35. Id.
36. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 307(a)(8), 307(e) (1989) (amended June 19, 1989, effective Aug. 1,
1989). At the time Rule 307 was amended, the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court was
Thomas J. Moran and the other Justices (in order of seniority) were Daniel P. Ward, Howard C.
Ryan, William G. Clark, Ben Miller, John J. Stamos and Horace L. Calvo. The amendments to
Rule 307 were adopted more than five years after the parental consent statute was enacted.
37. 776 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Il.1991).
38. Id. at 379-80, 382-84. Rule 307(e) appeared to contemplate an adversarial hearing on the
minor's petition when an ex parte hearing is clearly mandated by United States Supreme Court
precedent (see infra Part I); to allow persons other than the minor, her counsel and/or her
guardian ad litem to have access to the record of the bypass proceedings on appeal, thereby
compromising the requirement of confidentiality; and to allow the Illinois Appellate Court, on its
own motion, without any request by the minor or her attorney, to "order a different schedule" for
the filing of documents on appeal, thereby delaying prompt disposition of an appeal from an order
denying a petition. The Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of an obviously unconstitutional
judicial bypass rule was the first indication that the court, as then constituted, was more interested
in subverting the parental notice statute than in implementing it. This became evident when the
court set forth its reasons for refusing to adopt judicial bypass rule(s) under a later enacted
parental notice statute, which reasons are discussed infra Part III.
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E. The ParentalNotice of Abortion Act of 1995
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995 (the "Act"),3 9 which repealed both the Illinois
Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977,40 and the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1983.41 The 1995 Act requires actual or constructive
notice to "an adult family member" 4 2 at least forty-eight hours before an
abortion may be performed on an unmarried minor or incompetent
person. 43 Notice is not required, however, if "the minor or incompetent
person is accompanied by a person entitled to notice;" if "notice is
waived in writing by a person entitled to notice;" if "the attending
physician certifies in the patient's medical record that a medical
emergency exists and there is insufficient time to provide the required
notice;" if "the minor declares in writing that she is the victim of sexual
abuse, neglect, or physical abuse by an adult family member;" or if
notice is waived following a judicial bypass hearing. 44 With respect to
the last exception, notice may be waived by a court if the pregnant
minor (or incompetent person) is able to demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence in a judicial bypass hearing that she is
"sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide intelligently
alternative, that "notification...
whether to have an abortion," or, in the
45
would not be in [her] best interests."

39. Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995, Public Act No. 89-18 (effective June 1, 1995)
(codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1 to 70/99 (1996)).
40. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515/1 to 515/5 (West 1992), repealed by 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/90 (1996).
41. 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 520/1 to 520/10 (West 1992), repealed by 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/95 (1996).
42. "An adult family member" is defined as "a person over 21 years of age who is the parent,
grandparent, step-parent living in the household, or legal guardian." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10
(2007).
43. Id. § 70/15. "Actual notice" is defined as "the giving of notice directly, in person, or by
telephone." Id. § 70/10. "Constructive notice" is defined as "notice by certified mail to the last
known address of the person entitled to notice with delivery deemed to have occurred forty eight
hours after the certified notice is mailed." Id.
44. Id. § 70/20. "Medical emergency" is defined elsewhere in the Act as "a condition that, on
the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of
a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or
for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major
bodily function." Id. § 70/10. When notice is waived because of an allegation of sexual or
physical abuse or neglect, and the abuse or neglect must be reported to public authorities under
other laws of the state, the physician performing the abortion need not make the required
notification until after the abortion has been performed in accordance with the provisions of the
act. Id. § 70/20(4).
45. Id.§ 70/25(d)(1), (2).
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Section 25(f) of the Act specifies that "[a]n expedited confidential
appeal shall be available, as the [illinois] Supreme Court provides by

rule, to any minor or incompetent person to whom the circuit court
denies a waiver of notice." 4 6 Section 25(g) "respectfully requested" the
Supreme Court "to promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to
ensure that proceedings under this Act are handled in an expeditious and

confidential manner." 47 The General Assembly asked the Supreme
Court to provide the rule(s) requested by sections 25(f) and (g) because,

under the Illinois Constitution, the court has the exclusive authority to
authority (with the legislature)
adopt rules for appeals, 4 8 and concurrent
49
to adopt other rules of procedure.
On December 12, 1995, Daniel Pascale, the Administrative Director
of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, sent a one-page letter
to Attorney General Jim Ryan regarding the status of the promulgation
of the court rule(s) requested by section 25 of the Act. 50 In that letter,
Pascale informed General Ryan that members of the supreme court
directed him to advise Ryan that the court had decided not to
promulgate the rule(s) requested by the Illinois Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995.51 Pascale further advised Ryan that, effective
December 1, 1995, the court rescinded Rules 307(a)(8) and 307(e),
which had been promulgated pursuant to the 1983 Parental Notice of
Abortion Act. 52 As previously noted, Rule 307(e) had been held
unconstitutional by the federal district court. 5 3 Pascale's letter provided
no explanation for the court's refusal to promulgate the rule(s) required
54
to implement the 1995 Act.
46. Id. § 70/25(f) (emphasis added). An order allowing a waiver of notice is not appealable.
Id. § 70/25(f) (last sentence).
47. Id. § 70/25(g).
48. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (last sentence). See People ex rel Stamos v. Jones, 237 N.E.2d
495, 498 (I1. 1968) ("[T]he constitution has placed responsibility for governing appeal in the
Supreme Court, not the General Assembly.").
49. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (first sentence). Where rule-making authority is concurrent, a
judicial rule prevails over a conflicting statute. O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 492 N.E.2d 1322,
1326 (1986).
50. Letter from Daniel Pascale, Admin. Dir. of the Ill. Courts, to Jim Ryan, Ill. Att'y Gen.
(Dec. 12, 1995) (reprinted in Appendix A).
51. Id.
52. Id. The repeal of the earlier rule is reflected in the rules that appear in 166 Ill.2d cxxvcxxix (1995).
53. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 776 F. Supp. 375, 377 (N.D. Il. 1991).
54. At the time Rule 307(a)(8) and 307(e) were repealed, the Chief Justice of the Illinois
Supreme Court was Michael A. Bilandic and the other Justices (in order of seniority) were Ben
Miller, James D. Heiple, Charles E. Freeman, Moses W. Harrison U, Mary Ann G. McMorrow,
and John L. Nickels. No justice dissented from the repeal of Rules 307(a)(8) and 307(e) or the
court's refusal to issue the rule(s) required by the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995.
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Apparently in response to outrage expressed by Governor Edgar,
Attorney General Jim Ryan, and state legislators over the court's
decision not to adopt any rules, 55 Pascale, on January 25, 1996, sent a
five-page letter to Attorney General Ryan purporting to explain the

supreme court's reasons for not promulgating the rule(s) required by the
1995 Act. 56 Copies of the letter were sent to Governor Edgar, the
majority and minority leaders in the General Assembly, and federal
district court Judge Paul Plunkett (who was presiding over the challenge
to the Act). Because the Illinois Supreme Court refused to promulgate
the rule(s) necessary to implement the Act, Judge Plunkett permanently
5
enjoined the Act on February 8, 1996. 1
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL TO

ISSUE

THE JUDICIAL BYPASS APPEALS RULE(S)

In his letter of January 25, 1996 (reprinted in Appendix B),
attempting to explain why the Illinois Supreme Court had refused to
issue the judicial bypass appeal rules, Pascale made a number of
statements regarding state and federal constitutional law that have little
58
or no support in the applicable case law.
A. Is a Bypass Mechanism ConstitutionallyRequired?
Pascale first speculated that a one-parent notice of abortion statute
would not require a bypass mechanism of any kind. 59 There is little, if
any, basis for this speculation. Although the United States Supreme
Court has not squarely decided whether a one-parent notice of abortion
statute requires a bypass mechanism, 60 the Eighth Circuit Court of

55. See e.g., Dave McKinney, Teen Abortion Law Dies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at 1;
Janan Hanna and Christi Parsons, State Justices Quietly Kill Law on Notifying Parentof Abortion,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1996, § 1, at 1; Jean Latz Griffin, Abortion Bill Move Resented, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 26, 1996, Metro Northwest Section, at 1.
56. Letter from Daniel Pascale, Admin. Dir. of the 11. Courts, to Jim Ryan, Ill. Att'y Gen.
(Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Pascale Letter] (reprinted in Appendix B).
57. Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 CV 771, 1996 WL 33293423, at *1 (N.D. I11.Feb. 8, 1996) (The
district court held that the statute was "incomplete" because the bypass appeal rules had not been
adopted).
58. A highly condensed summary of the critique that follows in the text was first published by
the author in a letter to the editor shortly after Pascale's second letter was sent to the Attorney
General. See Paul Benjamin Linton, High Court Erred on Abortion Law, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19,
1996, § 1, at 12. At the time, the author was General Counsel for Americans United for Life.
59. See 1996 Pascale Letter, supra note 56 (second and third pages) (reprinted in Appendix
B).
60. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990) (failing to determine
whether a judicial bypass is necessary in order to uphold the constitutionality of a one-parent
notice statute).
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Appeals has held that a one-parent notice statute does require a judicial
bypass. 6 1 Pascale counted Justice Stevens as one of five Justices who
would uphold a one-parent notice statute without a bypass, but ignored
Justice Stevens' statement in Akron Center that "the State must provide
an adequate mechanism for cases in which the minor is mature or notice
would not be in her best interests." 62 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has suggested that a one-parent notice of abortion statute does
not require a judicial bypass mechanism for mature minors, 63 but that
suggestion was mere dictum and not a holding of the court. More to the
point, at the time Pascale sent his second letter (January 25, 1996), the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had twice held that parental notice
statutes must comply with the requirements of parental consent statutes,
including providing a judicial bypass mechanism. 64
Why Pascale
would have believed that the federal courts would have upheld a oneparent notice statute, without any kind of a bypass mechanism, is
baffling.
Regardless of the relative merits of Pascale's speculation regarding
the constitutionality of a one-parent notice of abortion statute without a
judicial bypass, the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 contains a
non-severability provision with respect to the judicial bypass
mechanism. Section 50 states, in part, that "Section 25 [the judicial
bypass] is inseverable to the extent that if all or any substantial part of
Section 25 is held invalid, then the entire Act is invalid. '6 5 This
language was included at the insistence of Governor Edgar who was
opposed to a pure notice (without judicial bypass) law. 66 Because of the
inclusion of this non-severability language, the 1995 Act stands or falls

61. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1458-63 (8th Cir. 1995)
(striking down a South Dakota one-parent notice of abortion statute that did not have a judicial
bypass mechanism), cert. denied sub nom. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic,
517 U.S. 1174 (1996).
62. Akron, 497 U.S. at 522 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63. Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 374-84 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
64. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1539 (7th Cir. 1985), affid by an equally divided
court, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 1082 (1988); Ind. Planned
Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).
65. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/50 (2008).
66. Editorial, When a Court Presumes to Legislate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1996, §1, at 12.

The judicial bypass . . . was a critical element of the political compromise in the
legislature-the bill would not have been approved without it. Such compromises are
essential to the legislative process and are, in fact, a legislative prerogative. Unless
there is something constitutionally wrong with that choice, the court is bound to respect
it.
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depending upon the existence of a valid judicial bypass, which requires
rules for an expedited, confidential appeal. Without proper appeal
rule(s), the judicial bypass provided by section 25 of the Act is
incomplete and the statute could not be enforced.
B. Must JudicialBypass ProceedingsBe Confidential and Ex Parte?
Pascale next stated that judicial bypass proceedings under parental
67
notice (or consent) statutes need not be confidential or ex parte.
Pascale cited no support for this claim.
The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in this area clearly contemplates that judicial bypass
proceedings be confidential and ex parte. Under binding Supreme
Court precedent, neither the parents nor the legal guardian of a minor
seeking a judicial bypass may be given notice of or participate in the
bypass hearing. 6 8 The whole point of judicial bypass proceedings is to
avoid giving notice to (or, in the case of consent statutes, obtaining
consent from) the minor's parent(s) or legal guardian. If the bypass
proceedings are not confidential and ex parte, they would fail to meet
federal constitutional standards. Pascale did not appear to be familiar
with the basic constitutional principles that govern judicial bypass
proceedings.
C. Must JudicialBypass ProceedingsBe Open to the Public and the
Press?
Pascale then suggested that confidential judicial proceedings do not
comport with the requirement of the First Amendment that all judicial
proceedings be open to the public (or at least the press). 6 9 Quite
obviously, if the court allowed the press to attend, the proceedings
would not have been confidential. To state that the proceedings must be
both confidential (as Supreme Court precedent requires) and open to the
press (as Pascale suggested) is to say that they could not take place at all
("squaring the circle"). Developing this suggestion further, Pascale
opined that ex parte, confidential judicial proceedings do not comport
with either the federal or state constitution because, apparently, all
judicial proceedings must be open to the press (if not also the public)

67. See 1996 Pascale Letter, supra note 56 (fourth page) (reprinted in Appendix B).
68. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1990) (explaining the
procedural safeguards implemented to maintain a minor's anonymity); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 647-48 (1979) (listing factors for courts to consider when determining whether to authorize
an abortion without parental consent).
69. See 1996 Pascale Letter, supra note 56 (fourth page) (reprinted in Appendix B).
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and must be adversarial. 70

Not surprisingly, Pascale provided no

authority in support of this opinion, either.
More than three-fourths of the States have enacted parental
involvement statutes with judicial bypass mechanisms. 7 1 Significantly,
no state supreme court has refused to issue the rules necessary to
72
implement those statutes on the grounds set forth in Pascale's letter,

nor have any such rules been challenged on those grounds. Moreover,
there are a variety of judicial proceedings which are confidential, ex

parte,

or

both:

proceedings

involving

juveniles

are

clearly

confidential; 73 probate proceedings may be non-adversarial; 7 4 and many
other judicial proceedings are both confidential and ex parte, including
grand jury proceedings, 75 applications for arrest warrants and search
77
warrants, 76 applications for emergency orders of protection,

applications

for

non-consensual

electronic

interceptions, 78

and

applications to seize books and records and/or freeze assets of persons
or entities suspected of terrorist activities. 79 Pascale's letter betrayed no
awareness of any of these statutes, all of which undermine his thesis.

Providing an ex parte, confidential judicial proceeding in which to

70. Id.
71. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 326 n.1 (2006)
(collecting statutes).
72. In one case, a state supreme court judge, joined by two other judges, dissented from an
order affirming, as modified, the denial of a bypass petition on the grounds that the bypass
hearing did not present a justiciable "case or controversy" under the state constitution because the
proceedings were non-adversarial, an issue that had not been raised by the minor. In re
Anonymous, 558 N.W.2d 784, 791-93 (Neb. 1997) (Caporale, J., dissenting). The majority
rejected this argument. Id. at 789-91.
73. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(6) (2008) (juvenile court proceedings); 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/1-8 (2008) (juvenile court records). See In re A Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (III.
1992) (press has no absolute right to attend juvenile court proceedings).
74. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1 to 5/5-3, 5/6-1 to 5/6-21 (2008).
75. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112-6 (2008).
76. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-9 (2008) (arrest warrants); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/108-3,
108-4 (2008) (search warrants).
77. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/111-8 (2008) (authorizing ex parte orders of protection to prohibit
domestic violence); 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/9.5 (2008) (authorizing ex parte orders of
protection to prevent elder abuse).
78. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/108B-1 to 5/108B-14 (2008) (granting chief judge of circuit court
authority to enter ex parte order authorizing interception of private oral communication based
upon a showing of probable cause).
79. 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/29D-65(a) (2008) (granting court authority to enter ex parte order
authorizing Attorney General or State's Attorney to freeze or seize all of the assets of any person
when there is probable cause to believe that such person has used or intends to use the property in
an act of terrorism); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/16.5(b) (2008) (granting court authority to enter
ex parte order authorizing Attorney General, upon a showing of probable cause, to seize books
and records and freeze assets of any charity engaged in terrorist acts).
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consider a bypass petition does not violate either the First Amendment
or any other provision of either the United States or Illinois
Constitution.
D. Could Bypass HearingsBe Held Before Nonjudicial Officers?
Finally, Pascale suggested that bypass hearings could be held before
administrative, not judicial, officers. 80 The United States Supreme
81
Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of such a procedure.
But this suggestion would not necessarily avoid the concerns Pascale
expressed regarding non-adversarial judicial hearings. Normally, a
party aggrieved by a final judgment or order of an administrative
agency or official has the right to obtain judicial review of that
82
judgment or order, either by statute or common law writ of certiorari.
Thus, establishing a procedure under which bypass hearings are
conducted, in the first instance, by administrative hearing officers would
not avoid the "problem" Pascale identified in his letter (i.e., a court
being required to decide an issue in an ex parte, non-adversarial
setting); it would only delay the problem until the matter reached a
court following the denial of a bypass petition. Moreover, the inevitable
delay that would attend judicial review of an administrative decision
denying a bypass petition could jeopardize the constitutionality of any
attempt to adopt such a mechanism. In any event,
[w]hen the [1]egislature has expressly chosen a judicial forum for the
resolution of these issues [determination of maturity and best interests
in a judicial bypass hearing], it is not this court's province to rewrite
the statute or suggest alternate or additional procedures to be utilized
in this context, unless the judicial bypass statute violates ... the state

[c]onstitution. ... the federal [c]onstitution
(or any federal law made
83

pursuant thereto), or.

..

a federal treaty.

80. See 1996 Pascale Letter, supra note 56 (fourth page) (reprinted in Appendix B).
81. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492 n.20
(1983) (declining to consider "whether a qualified and independent non-judicial decisionmaker
would be appropriate"); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.22 (1979) ("We do not suggest...
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not delegate the alternative procedure to a
juvenile court or an administrative agency or officer.").
82. Although the Illinois Supreme Court has held that "there is no constitutional right to
appeal administrative decisions," ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 727 N.E.2d 1022,
1024 (I11.2000), and that "the right to appeal from an administrative decision is not essential to
due process of law," Carver v. Nail, 714 N.E.2d 486, 491 (Ill. 1999), there may be a due process
right to appeal an administrative decision that has resulted in the denial of a substantive federal
constitutional right. See generally 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §

17.9 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing judicial review of administrative agency actions involving
constitutional rights).
83. In re Anonymous, 558 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Neb. 1997).
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The Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 does not violate the
state or federal constitution, any federal law, or any treaty.
In light of the foregoing, it would be difficult to describe the Illinois
Supreme Court's refusal to issue the judicial bypass appeal rule(s)
required by the parental notice act as, in Pascale's words, "a thoughtful
decision." 84 Moreover, his effort to explain the court's refusal to issue
the rule(s) struck some observers as a "thin-skinned response." 85 The
Chicago Sun-Times called the supreme court's refusal to issue the rules
"high-handed," the explanation for the court's action "belated and
inadequate," and said that, regardless of one's views regarding abortion,
everyone should be "outraged by this affront." 86 The Chicago Tribune
was no kinder, accusing the court of effectively killing the parental
notice statute, not because it was unconstitutional, but because "[i]t just
didn't like the law." 8 7 The article continued: "If the justices want the
power to veto laws simply because they don't like them, one of them
ought to run for governor. Otherwise, they ought to accept their
responsibility as the state's highest court and reconsider this misguided
88
decision."
As a direct result of the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to issue the
judicial bypass appeal rule(s) required by the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995, the federal district court, as previously noted,
permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act. 89 That is where matters
stood for more than ten years. During that time frame (1995 through
2006), more than 40,000 abortions were performed on Illinois minors,
almost four thousand of which were performed on minors fourteen
years of age or younger. 90 Because of the Illinois Supreme Court's
refusal to issue the judicial bypass appeal rule(s) under the 1995 Act,
not one of those minors was required to notify either of her parents or
84. Christi Parsons & Janan Hanna, Justices Reject Abortion-law Blame: State Law's Demise
Puts Court on Defense, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1996, §1, at 1.
85. Id. Steven Lubet, a highly regarded professor of law at Northwestern University, called
Pascale's explanation "extraordinary." Id. To be fair to Mr. Pascale, however, it is likely that the
five-page letter was drafted by one of the justices' law clerks, not Mr. Pascale, who held an
administrative position with the court.
86. Editorial, Court Is Out of Line On Abortion Ruling, CH. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at 33.
87. Editorial, When a Court Presumes to Legislate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1996, §1, at 12.
88. Id. Years later, Eric Zorn, an ardent supporter of legalized abortion, characterized the
court's refusal to act as "high-handed, unilateral and legally dubious." Eric Zorn, MadiganMove
on Consent [sic] Law Isn't Final Word, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2007, Metro Sec. (Chicagoland Final
Ed.), at 1.
89. Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 CV 771 (N.D. 111.Feb. 8, 1996) (order granting permanent

injunction).
90. Illinois Department of Public Health Statistics, http://www.idph.state.il.us/health/
statshome.htm (aggregated from figures available by clicking the yearly abortion statistics links).
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legal guardian of her decision to obtain an abortion. And for more than
ten years after the Act was enjoined, neither Attorney General Jim Ryan
nor his successor, Attorney General Lisa Madigan, requested that the
state supreme court reconsider its decision refusing to promulgate the
appeal rule(s), even though the composition of the court gradually
changed and, by 2006, only one member of the court that had refused to
91
issue the rule(s) was still serving.
IV. BREAKING THE LOGJAM
Early in January 2005, the author met with representatives of the
principal prolife organizations in Illinois to discuss legal strategies for
resuscitating the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995. It was the
author's position that any attempt to enact a new parental notice statute
would be doomed to failure if the state supreme court continued to
refuse to issue judicial bypass appeal rules, and that any effort by the
legislature to enact such rules would be struck down as violating the
court's exclusive right to adopt rules governing appeals. 92 Instead, the
author proposed a strategy of petitioning the supreme court to issue the
rules under the 1995 Act.
After debate and discussion, the
representatives of the organizations accepted this strategy. Two months
later, in March 2005, the author, along with several prolife
representatives, met with DuPage County State's Attorney Joseph
Birkett to ask him to file a petition with the state supreme court
requesting the court to issue the judicial bypass appeal rule(s) necessary
to implement the 1995 Act. Birkett agreed to do so. After various
delays, Birkett filed a petition with the supreme court on June 28, 2006,
and submitted a proposed rule to put the Act into effect. On September
7, 2006, the author, representing a consortium of prolife organizations,
churches, and religious groups, filed a twenty-three page supplemental
petition with the court in support of Birkett's petition.
The
supplemental petition provided the court with a detailed critique of its
stated reasons for refusing to issue the judicial bypass appeal rule(s),
suggested guidelines for drafting an appropriate rule, and proposed
minor changes to the rule proposed by Birkett.
On Monday, September 18, 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court
announced that it was going to promulgate the rule(s) necessary to

91. By February 1, 2001, a majority of the Justices who had refused to issue the judicial
bypass rule(s) in 1995 had retired and been replaced by newly elected or appointed Justices. At
the time, then Attorney General Ryan had almost two full years remaining in his second term.
92. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (last sentence).
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implement the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995. 9 3 Two days
later, on September 20, 2006, it adopted Rule 303A.9 4 Both the
Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Tribune applauded the court's
decision to adopt the rule(s) necessary to allow the parental notice law
to go into effect, and underscored their support for the law. 9 5 Rejecting
Planned Parenthood's criticism that adoption of Rule 303A was a
"shameless political move" in an election year, the Chicago Tribune
stated that the Illinois Supreme Court "did indeed allow politics to creep
into the courtroom-almost 11 years ago [when it refused to issue the
appeal rules]. All it is doing now is correcting that mistake. '96 The
Chicago Tribune noted that the state supreme court "didn't rule on the
constitutionality of the law" in 1995 but instead "killed the law" by
"refusing to write the rules ....,97 "The state court sat on its hands; in
effect, it vetoed a law supported by the governor and a majority of the
House and Senate." 9 8 As a result, "[t]he measure languished for a
decade," during which "six of the seven justices involved in the original
decision have left the court," a fact that "did not escape the notice of
those who think [that] abortion is too weighty a decision for most
teenagers to make without adult guidance." 9 9 The Chicago Tribune
mentioned that DuPage County State's Attorney Joseph Birkett had
petitioned the court to "reconsider the issue," and that his petition was
supported by the Thomas More Society (Chicago, Illinois), which
represented ten other organizations that oppose abortion. 10 0 In the
penultimate paragraph of its editorial, the Chicago Tribune stated that in
issuing Rule 303A, the Illinois Supreme Court "made a sound legal

93.

Michael Higgins & Bonnie Miller Rubin, State Court Revives Teen Abortion Law, CHI.

TRIB., Sept. 19, 2006, §1 (Chi. Final Ed.), at 1.
94. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 303A (adopted Sept. 20, 2006); see also Michael Higgins, Rules Issued
on Notice of Teen Abortions, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2006, Metro Sec., at 1; Abdon M. Pallasch,
Court Issues Rules on Abortion Law: Notificationfor Minors Faces One More Hurdle, CHI. SUNTIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at 6; Christopher Wills, Supreme Court Issues Rules For Teen Abortions,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 20, 2006, at 1.
95. Editorial, After All, It Is the Law, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2006, § 1,at 24 [hereinafter After
All, It Is the Law]; Editorial, Parents Need to Know If Minor Child Has Abortion, CHI. SUN-

TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at 41.
96. After All, It Is the Law, supra note 95.
97. id.
98. Id.

99. Id. Justice Freeman was the one remaining justice from the court that had refused to issue
the judicial bypass appeal rules.
100. Id. As previously noted, the author drafted the supplemental petition for the Thomas
More Society on behalf of a consortium of prolife organizations, churches and religious

organizations.
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decision, reversing a strange decision to disregard its responsibilities.
10 1
The best thing you can say about that is, it's about time."
V. THE RETURN TO FEDERAL COURT
The Illinois Supreme Court promulgated Rule 303A on September
20, 2006. The Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, however, did not
promptly return to federal court to request that the court lift the tenyear-old injunction against enforcement of the statute. This led to
speculation that Madigan, a supporter of legalized abortion, was
dragging her feet. In mid-December 2006, three months after Rule
303A was adopted, DuPage County State's Attorney Joseph Birkett
stated publicly that he was prepared to go to court within a matter of
weeks to try to revive the 1995 Act if the Attorney General did not do
so herself. 10 2 "The law is now complete," Birkett explained, "so we
need to move to lift the injunction .... It's not a complicated issue. It's
relatively simple and straightforward." 10 3 Cara Smith, a spokeswoman
for the Attorney General, denied that the controversial nature of the
issue had anything to do "with the pace at which our efforts have moved
forward." 10 4 According to Smith, officials in the Attorney General's
Office had met with representatives from the ACLU of Illinois, Planned
Parenthood, and the offices of Birkett and Cook County State's
Attorney Richard Devine. 1° 5 They had also talked with court clerks
around the State and had conducted "exhaustive research" on the
106
issues.
Finally, on January 19, 2007, four months after Rule 303A was
adopted, Attorney General Madigan filed a five-page petition asking the
federal district court to dissolve the permanent injunction issued in 1996
by Judge Plunkett following the Illinois Supreme Court announcement
in December 1995 that it would not promulgate any judicial bypass
appeal rule(s). I0 7 After reciting the history of the -litigation, the state
101. Id.
102. Michael Higgins, Birkett Seeks to Revive Parental Notice of Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
20, 2006, Metro Sec., at 4.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Ann Spillane, the Attorney General's Chief of Staff, later admitted to a reporter that
"We did not do any real research at all" into whether the state courts would need time to prepare
for judicial bypass hearings under the statute and the implementing rule. Michael Higgins,
Justices Gave Abortion Law Extra Push, Cm. TRIB., May 6, 2007, Metro Sec., at 1.
107. Defendants' Petition To Present Judicial Bypass Rule For Review And For Further
Relief, Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771 (N.D. 1l. Jan. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Petition]. Given
the brevity of the petition, which simply recited the history of the litigation, noted the adoption of
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supreme court's refusal to issue the judicial bypass appeal rule(s) in
1995, and the court's subsequent adoption of such a rule on September
20, 2006, the petition stated that "[i]t is ... appropriate at this time to
ask this Court to review the 1995 Act and Rule 303A." 10 8 Accordingly,
the Attorney General asked the district court to "set an appropriate
schedule to determine the constitutionality of the 1995 Act and the new
rule." 10 9 In the very next paragraph of her petition, however, the
Attorney General asked the district court to stay "any order allowing the
statute to take effect ... until such time as the circuit court and appellate
court systems throughout the State are administratively prepared to
implement the judicial bypass procedures provided by the 1995 Act and
Rule 303A."' 11 0 To assist the court and the parties in making that
evaluation, the Attorney General asked the district court to appoint a
''special master" to "report on the status of the State Court Systems'
preparation to implement the judicial bypass procedures."' 1 1 In her
prayer for relief, Attorney General Madigan requested that the district
court "dissolve the February 9, 1996 injunction," but "[s]tay any order
dissolving the February 9, 1996 injunction until such time as the circuit
court and appellate court systems are administratively prepared to
implement the judicial bypass procedures provided by the 1995 Act and
Rule 303A.""' 1 2
On February 6, 2007, Federal District Court Judge David Coar, to
whom the case had been reassigned from Judge Plunkett, who was no
longer sitting, held a hearing on the Attorney General's petition. At the
outset of the hearing, Judge Coar expressed some uncertainty about
"what we're doing here." 113 After noting that the court issued a
permanent injunction in 1996, Judge Coar said that the only jurisdiction
he would have in the case would be to vacate the injunction, if that were
Rule 303A and asked the district court to schedule a hearing to determine the constitutionality of
the 1995 Act and the implementing rule, it is not clear why it took four months for the Attorney
General to prepare the pleading, especially in light of the fact that the petition was not supported
by a memorandum discussing the applicable law. The lack of an implementing judicial bypass

appeal rule was the only basis on which enforcement of the 1995 Act had been permanently
enjoined on February 9, 1996, which was cured by the adoption of Rule 303A on September 20,
2006.
108. Petition, supra note 107, at 13.
109. Id. 14.
110. Id. 15. The petition set forth no facts on the basis of which one could conclude that the
state courts were not prepared to handle judicial bypass petitions and any appeals from the denial
of such petitions. Nor, as it turns out, was the Attorney General aware of any such facts, as her
Chief of Staff later admitted. See Higgins, supra note 106, at 1.
111. Id. 16 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 53).
112. Id. at 5, Prayer for Relief, U 2, 3.
113. Transcript of Proceedings at 2, Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771 (N.D. 111.Feb. 6, 2007).
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appropriate. 114 Although Thomas Ioppolo, the Assistant Attorney
General handling the case, did ask the court to dissolve the injunction,
he immediately added that "the injunction isn't ready to be dissolved
tomorrow because . . . we recognize that there would be some time
115
needed for the Circuit Courts of Illinois to prepare themselves."
Judge Coar asked, "If it's not ripe [for decision] yet, then why are you
the gun and
here? If it's not ripe for a decision yet, haven't you jumped
'1 16
shouldn't we just wait until this case is ready to proceed?"
Judge Coar seemed perplexed by the Attorney General's request for a
''special master," expressing the view that there was no need for a
special master and that the appointment of one "doesn't ...make any
sense." 117 Throughout the hearing, Judge Coar repeatedly questioned
the need for appointment of a special master and what her (the proposed
special master's) authority would be in monitoring the ability of the
Illinois state courts to implement the judicial bypass proceedings and
appeals. 118 Judge Coar pointed out the internal inconsistency in the
Attomey General's submission:
I mean, it seems to me that the Attorney General is trying to have
her cake and eat it too. Either the State of Illinois' position is that the
statute is constitutional now or it's not. If it's their position that it's
constitutional now, then there may be a factual question as to whether
or not the Circuit Courts where these petitions would be filed in the
first instance are ready to handle them, and the Appellate Courts
where they would then go are ready to handle them.
But that would all be - all involve questions which would come up,
factual questions which would come up in a hearing. I'm always
concerned about appointing a special master because a special master
is something above the parties but below the Court, and in my view
special masters - the role and the powers of a special master have to
be clearly specified. And I'm not sure under the scenario that you've
described what the role of a special master would be other than doing
what everybody else can do, [that] is collecting information.
For example, it's not clear to me what power the special master
would have to pass on the substance of the rules. Suppose one of the
Circuit Courts came up with rules that just made no sense. Would the
special master certify that there were rules in place but inadequate? I
don't know how that works. And without that kind of thing I just
don't see that a special master is appropriate.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.at4.
Id.

Id.at5.
118. Id.at5-9.
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On whether we should go forward at this point, it just seems to me
that either it's the position that the statute as-with the rules as
implemented is ready to be considered-the constitutionality of it is
ready to be considered or it's not. And we shouldn't wait untileither we should wait to take up the Rule 60 motion until such time as
the State of Illinois is ready to implement the statute or we shouldn't.
But I don't think that we should go119
halfway on this. I'm not quite sure
that the motion is ripe at this time.
Judge Coar recognized his authority to vacate an injunction, but he
was not sure that was what the Attorney General was asking him to
do. 120 In light of the "request for a stay," the State was apparently
arguing that "we really need to wait and see what these [A]ppellate and
Circuit Court rules look like." 12 1 If so, there would be no need to take
up the question of constitutionality "until we see what [those] rules look
like .... "-122 Judge Coar ultimately determined that the matter was not
"ripe yet for a decision," and denied the Attorney General's petition to
present the judicial bypass rule for review and for further relief "at this
124
time." 12 3 The denial was without prejudice.
In view of Attorney General Madigan's presentation on February 6,
2007, Judge Coar's denial without prejudice of her petition was entirely
reasonable. The Attorney General's request that her petition to dissolve
the permanent injunction be stayed while a special master be appointed
to monitor the state courts' ability to comply with the statute and the
implementing rule was unprecedented and unwarranted.

First, the request for an appointment of a special master was
improper.

Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs

appointments of special masters. Under Rule 53(a)(1), unless a statute
provides otherwise, a court may appoint a master only to:
(A) perform duties consented to by the parties;
(B) hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on
issues to be decided by the court without a jury if appointment is
warranted by
(i) some exceptional condition; or

119. Id. at 8-9.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 11.
124. The request for appointment of a special master fueled speculation by DuPage County
State's Attorney Birkett and officials of the Thomas More Society that the Attorney General was
delaying taking the action necessary to put the 1995 Act into effect. See Michael Higgins & Judy
Peres, Abortion Law Called Legal, CHI.TRIB., Jan. 20, 2007, § 1, at 1.
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(ii) the need to perform an accounting or resolve a difficult
computation of damages; or
(C) address pre[-]trial and post[-]trial matters that cannot be
effectively and timely addressed12 by
an available district judge or
5
magistrate judge of the district.
The Attorney General's request for the appointment of a special
master fell into none of these categories. More specifically, it was not a
request to which the other parties consented, it did not relate to trial
proceedings, and it did not address either pre-trial or post-trial matters
that could not be addressed "effectively and timely" by Judge Coar,
who was perfectly willing to address a proper motion to dissolve the
injunction, but not a "start/stop" motion like the one the Attorney
General submitted. The Attorney General did not quote the provisions
of Rule 53 in her petition, nor did she explain how her request for the
appointment of a special master satisfied the requirements of the rule.
Perhaps she might have argued that it fell within the scope of (a)(1)(B),
to "hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on
issues to be decided by the court without a jury."
That authorization applies, however, only "if appointment is
warranted by (i) some exceptional condition, or (ii) the need to perform
an accounting or resolve a difficult computation of damages." The
latter exception does not apply. What about the former? Did the
Attorney General set forth an "exceptional condition" warranting
appointment of a special master? Judge Coar did not think so, and the
case law supports that judgment.
In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,126 the United States Supreme Court,
interpreting similar language in an earlier version of Rule 53
("exceptional circumstances"), held that courts should narrowly
construe these exceptional circumstances. 127 In La Buy, the Court
rejected the appointment of a special master to resolve two complex
antitrust cases despite the congestion of the district court's calendar of
cases, the complexity of the issues, and the length of time required to try
the cases. 12 8 The Court called the referral of these cases to a special
master "little less than an abdication of the judicial function" that
justified the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. 129 A district court
may use special masters, the Court cautioned, only "to aid judges in the
performance of special judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress
125.
126.

FED. R. CIv. P. 53(a).
352 U.S. 249 (1957).

127. Id. at 256-60.
128. Id. at 258-59.
129. Id.at 256.
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13 1
of a cause." 130 In Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Surinam Navigation Co.,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disapproved of referring a
case to a special master, stating that the fact "[t]hat the case involves
complex issues of fact and law is no justification for reference to a

[m ]aster....

"132

Whether the Illinois courts are administratively prepared to handle
judicial bypass petitions and appeals under the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995 does not present an "exceptional condition," as
that term is used in Rule 53(a)(1)(B)(i) that warrants the appointment of
a special master. Nor is such an appointment warranted under Rule
53(a)(1)(C) to "address pre-trial and post-trial matters that cannot be
addressed effectively and timely by an available district judge or
magistrate judge of the district." Judge Coar did not express any
unwillingness to hear evidence on the ability of Illinois courts and court
officials to administer the parental notice statute, even assuming that
such evidence is relevant in a pre-enforcement challenge. When special
masters have been appointed, it frequently has been in the context of
monitoring compliance with judicial decrees in exceptionally complex
cases where a determination of unconstitutional conduct already has
133
been made.
Second, the Attorney General's request for a stay was improper. The
plaintiffs challenged the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 on its
face, not as-applied in any particular circumstances. Although a
"systemic failure" of a parental notice or consent statute in practice may
provide a basis for an as-applied challenge, 134 a pre-enforcement facial
challenge to a notice or consent statute that has never gone into effect
cannot be brought on the basis of speculation that state courts and court
officials are not prepared to handle judicial bypass petitions. 135 For
example, Barnes v. Mississippi presents facts remarkably similar to
those present here. In Barnes, plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement
facial challenge to Mississippi's parental consent statute. In support of
130. Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted).
131. 381 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1967).
132. Id. at 550-51.
133. See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 767-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(appointing special master "with expertise in government housing laws and in educational

administration" to work with parties in formulating "remedial plans" in school desegregation
case), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Austin, 511 F.2d 82, 83 (7th Cir.

1975) (explaining the same proposition with respect to appointment of master in monitoring
desegregation decree).
134. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 868 F.2d 459, 469 (1st Cir. 1989)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
135. See Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1993).
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the district court's preliminary injunction, the abortion providers argued
that "the Chancery Court system in Mississippi will be unable to
implement the statute in a constitutional manner." 136 More specifically,
the abortion providers
[P]resented affidavits to the district court indicating that most court
clerks are either unfamiliar with the bypass procedures or are
completely unaware that a minor could obtain an abortion without her
parents' consent. They argue further that there are insufficient
chancellors to hear cases and that court-appointed counsel will be

difficult to obtain. They [also] worry that true confidentiality will be
difficult or impossible to maintain since court personnel in small
towns will recognize minors coming to court seeking the parental
consent waiver. 137

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that these
allegations failed to provide a basis on which to enjoin enforcement of
the statute:
All of these objections might be appropriate in an as-applied challenge
to the constitutionality of the statute. But to sustain a facial challenge,
the plaintiffs must show that under no circumstances could the law be
constitutional.[ 13 8] Before the law is even implemented, this court is

obliged to presume that state officials will act in accordance with the
law. [Ohio v.] Akron [Center for Reproductive Health], 497 U.S.
[502], 513 . . . [1990] ("We refuse to base a decision on the facial

validity of a statute on the mere possibility of unauthorized, illegal
disclosure by state employees."). There is no demonstrated pattern of
136.
137.

Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1342-43.

138. Id.
at 1343 (internal citation omitted). Although there is a split in the circuit courts as to
whether, in a facial challenge, the challenger must show that an abortion statute is
unconstitutional in all applications, per the rule enunciated for facial challenges in United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), there is no dispute that, at a minimum, the challenger must
show that it is unconstitutional in a "large fraction" of the cases to which it applies. See
Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 367-68, 373-74 (6th Cir. 2006)
(interpreting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)); see also A Woman's
Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to
follow, in the context of a facial challenge to an abortion regulation, the "no set of circumstances"
rule of Salerno). It would be speculative to suggest, in advance, that a statute would be
improperly administered in a "large fraction" of cases. Id.
In reversing Judge Coar and dissolving the permanent injunction issued against enforcement of
the Act, the Seventh Circuit recognized that "there is some disagreement over whether Casey's
'large fraction' test remains vital in light of more recent Supreme Court precedent affirming
United States v. Salerno's instruction that plaintiffs can only succeed in a facial challenge by
'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Zbaraz v.
Madigan, 572 F.3d 370, 381 n.6 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). The Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to
resolve this disagreement, determining that "the Illinois notice act is constitutional under either
standard." Id.
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abuse or defiance here that would warrant the court to presume
otherwise. Too, remand for an a priori factual determination on
whether a state was ready to implement its bypass procedure would
likely draw upon "evidence" that is very speculative. 139
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the parental
consent statute was facially valid, vacated the preliminary injunction,
and remanded the cause to the district court for entry of an order of
14 0
dismissal.
Just as in Barnes, questions as to whether state court judges and court
personnel are administratively prepared to deal with judicial bypass
petitions and appeals from their denial under the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995 and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303A could not
be decided in the context of plaintiffs' facial challenge.
Those
questions must await an as-applied challenge after the statute and rule
have been allowed to go into effect. 14 1 The Supreme Court has
emphasized that, "[a]bsent a demonstrated pattern of abuse or defiance,
a State may expect that its judges will follow mandated procedural
142
requirements."
The representations made by the Attorney General in her petition
filed on January 19, 2007, and in her oral presentation to Judge Coar on
February 6, 2007-that the Illinois courts were not administratively
prepared to address judicial bypass petitions-were not well received by
the Illinois Supreme Court. At the request of the full court, Chief
Justice Bob Thomas telephoned Attorney General Madigan in February
2007, after the hearing before Judge Coar, and disputed her
representations that the state courts were not prepared to administer the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995.143 The Chief Justice's
telephone call was followed up with a one-page letter to the Attorney
139. Barnes, 992 F.2d at 1343.
140. Id.
141. See Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 271 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that a plaintiff
challenging a parental consent statute that is constitutional on its face "must . . . introduce
evidence showing that the statutory program is actually applied in a manner which does not
comply with Bellotti [v. Baird,443 U.S. 622 (1979)]").
142. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515 (1990). In addition to the
foregoing, there is another reason why appointment of a special master would have been
inappropriate. Neither the federal district court, nor any special master appointed by the court,
has the authority to supervise the ability of state courts to comply with the parental notice statute
and the implementing rule, and neither may direct state courts or state court officials to take any
particular action with respect to either the statute or the rule. The district court's jurisdiction, as
Judge Coar properly noted, was limited to determining whether the statute, as supplemented by
the rule, is constitutional.
143. Michael Higgins, Justices Gave Abortion Law Extra Push, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 2007,
Metro Sec., at I.
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General, signed by all seven justices, including Justice Freeman, the
sole remaining justice from the court that had refused to issue the
judicial bypass rules in 1995. The first paragraph of the letter, dated
February 27, 2007, noted that Chief Justice Thomas had called Attorney
General Madigan at the request of the full court to express the justices'
144
concerns regarding the representations she had made to Judge Coar.
The second paragraph stated as follows:
Representations made by the Illinois Attorney General's Office to
Judge David Coar to the effect that the circuit and appellate courts of
Illinois were not administratively prepared to proceed in adjudicating
matters brought pursuant to the Parental Notification Act were in
error. The Illinois Supreme Court, having adopted Supreme Court
Rule 303A, is in compliance with section "g" of the Parental
Notification Act. We presume, and therefore assert that, as with the
enactment of any new law,
our state courts are prepared to proceed to
145
apply the law as enacted.
Less than one month after receiving this letter, Attorney General
Madigan returned to federal court with a motion asking Judge Coar to
dissolve the February 8, 1996 permanent injunction. 146 In her revised
motion, the Attorney General abandoned her earlier request for
appointment of a special master and simply asked that the permanent
injunction be dissolved because, with the adoption of Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 303A, "the 1995 Act is now complete, and the predicate
underlying the permanent injunction order has disappeared."' 147 A tenpage memorandum supported the motion. 14 8 The plaintiffs responded
with a sixteen-page memorandum opposing the Attorney General's
motion. 149
In their memorandum, the plaintiffs argued that state courts were not
prepared to administer the parental notice Act and that the Illinois
Supreme Court's adoption of Rule 303A failed to cure the constitutional
defects of the 1995 Act. 150 In support of the former argument, plaintiffs

144. Letter from Bob Thomas, C.J., 11. Sup. Ct., to Lisa Madigan, I11.
Att'y Gen. (Feb. 27,
2007) (reprinted letter, on file as Appendix C).
145. Id. 2. Section "g" refers to 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/25(g) (2006).
146. Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the February 9, 1996 Permanent Injunction Order,
Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028 (N.D. I1. Feb. 28, 2008).
147. Id. at *5.
148. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the February 9, 1996
Permanent Injunction Order, Zbaraz, 2008 WL 589028 (No. 84 C 771).
149. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the February 9, 1996
Permanent Injunction Order, Zbaraz, 2008 WL 589028 (No. 84 C 771) [hereinafter Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion].
150. Id. at'*3-15.
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attached several declarations to their memorandum purporting to show
that the circuit court clerks in certain counties "are not prepared-with
detailed protocols, adequate staffing and clear training-to implement
the process with absolute confidentiality and precise expedition . . .,151
The declaration of Dorothy Brown (Exhibit C), the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, the most populous county in Illinois
where most of the abortions in the state are performed, is of particular
interest. According to her declaration, Ms. Brown participated in a
press conference on October 10, 2006, shortly after the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted Rule 303A, "to discuss the burden these petitions for
waiver [of notice] would put on my office and to make it clear that [she]
did not have procedures, staffing, or resources in place that would allow
[her office] to properly implement the Act and Rule 303A." 152 As of
mid-May 2007, seven months later, "[t]he situation ha[d] not changed..
. .- 153 Ms. Brown added that it was necessary for her office "to develop
new procedures to comply with the directives of the Act and Rule
154
303A," which, she emphasized, would require "a lengthy schedule."
Curiously, Ms. Brown did not identify in her declaration any steps that
she had taken to "develop new procedures" or train her staff to handle
judicial bypass petitions in the eight months since the state supreme
court adopted Rule 303A.
In support of the latter argument-that the adoption of Rule 303A did
not cure the constitutional defects in the 1995 Act-plaintiffs claimed,
first, that "the Act denies 'immature, best interest' minors the right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy, because it fails to confer authority
upon the circuit courts to consent to abortion for these minors," 15 5 and,
second, that "even as supplemented by Rule 303A, significant gaps
deny assurance of confidentiality and expedition for all teens who seek

151. Id. at *3-4; see also List of Exhibits Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dissolve the February 9, 1996 Permanent Injunction Order at Exhibits C-G, Zbaraz, No. 84 C
771, 2008 WL 589028 [hereinafter List of Exhibits].
152. List of Exhibits, supra note 151, Exhibit C, at *3.
153. Id. at *3.
154. Id. Ms. Brown did not specify how much additional time she needed.
155. Id. at *7-8. The statute under review requires parental notice, not parental consent. In a
judicial bypass proceeding, the circuit court may waive the requirement of notice if it determines
that it is not in the best interests of a pregnant minor to notify either of her parents (or other "adult
family member") of her decision to obtain an abortion. If the court waives notice, it need not also
authorize the minor to consent to an abortion. The authority of pregnant minors to consent to
medical and surgical treatment is specifically recognized by the Consent by Minors to Medical
Procedures Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/0.01-210/5 (2008), a citation that was buried in
plaintiffs' memorandum. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion, supra note 149, at
*9 n.9. Inexplicably, the Attorney General did not cite this Act in her reply memorandum.
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to avail themselves of the bypass process."' 156 The defendants filed
their reply to the plaintiffs' memorandum on June 21, 2007.157 The
matter was then taken under advisement.
On February 28, 2008, Judge Coar issued his Memorandum Opinion
and Order, denying the defendants' motion to dissolve the permanent
injunction order entered on February 9, 1996.158 Judge Coar dismissed
out of hand plaintiffs' argument that the state courts were not prepared
to administer the 1995 Act, as supplemented by Rule 303A. Citing the
February 27, 2007, letter from the Illinois Supreme Court, Judge Coar
"decline[d] to speculate that the state courts cannot adequately
implement the law, before it has had a chance to carry out the
procedures." 159 "If the implementation is inadequate and an injury
occurs, the injured party may then bring a separate suit when the issue is
ripe. In the mean time, this court will presume that the state courts can
' 160
and will carry out Rule 303A procedures properly and adequately."
Judge Coar also rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the Act and the Rule
did not ensure confidentiality of the proceedings or an expeditious
16 1
hearing and appeal from the denial of a judicial bypass petition.
Judge Coar, however, did agree with the plaintiffs that the Act is
unconstitutional because, although the Act "authorizes the court to
waive parental notification when it is in the 'best interest' of the child,"
it "does not authorize a method of consent for the abortion. Thus, under
the statute, a 'best interest' minor who has waived parental notification
is left without a mechanism to obtain consent for the abortion, and thus
is in legal limbo." 162 Defendants had argued that "the [notice] statute
would be contradictory if interpreted in this fashion, and that it should
be assumed that authorization of consent for an abortion is granted
when parental notification is waived."' 16 3 Judge Coar rejected this
argument, explaining that "Defendants' interpretation . . . reads
something into the statute that is not there, and further is not supported
by the case law or statutes of other states." 164 Judge Coar concluded:
156. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion, supra note 149, at 8.
157. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dissolve February 9,
1996 Permanent Injunction Order, Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028 (N.D. Ill.,
Feb. 28, 2008).
158. Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028 (N.D. 111.Feb. 28, 2008), rev'd, 572
F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009).
159. Id. at *6.
160. Id.
161. Id. at'*8-12.
162. Id. at *6.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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The Illinois statute lacks the language that permits a state court to
authorize the consent for an abortion. This court cannot presume that
the statute authorizes something that it does not state. As such, the
minor is left without recourse, except to obtain consent from her
parents, which the court, under these circumstances, has deemed not in
her best interest. The statute is contradictory and incomplete on its
face without an authorization of consent provision, and this court5
16
declines to lift the permanent injunction under these circumstances.
VI. ANALYSIS OF JUDGE COAR' S DECISION

Judge Coar's opinion proceeded on two assumptions. First, that a
finding that "notification . . .would not be in the best interests of the
minor" under section 25(d)(2) of the Act necessarily implies an adverse
finding under section 25(d)(1), i.e., that the minor is not "sufficiently
mature and well enough informed to decide intelligently whether to
have an abortion." Second, that an "immature" minor for whom the
court has waived notice under section 25(d)(2) of the Act ("best
interests") lacks authority under Illinois law to give effective consent to
the performance of an abortion. Both assumptions are wrong.
First, a minor seeking a judicial waiver of notice under section 25 of
the Act is not required to allege that she is "sufficiently mature and well
enough informed to decide intelligently whether to have an
abortion." 166 The minor may decide, for a variety of reasons (or no
reason at all), to allege only that "notification ...would not be in [her]
best interests ... ."167 Accordingly, a finding that notification would
not be in her "best interests" under section 25(d)(2) could not logically
(or legally) be regarded as an implied finding that she failed to satisfy
the "maturity" standard of section 25(d)(1).
Second, even if a minor seeking a judicial waiver of notice alleges
both her "maturity" under section 25(d)(1) and "best interests" under
section 25(d)(2), nothing in the Act requires the court to make a finding
with respect to her maturity if it finds that notification is not in her "best
interests." 16 8 A finding that notification would not be in the minor's
"best interests" implies nothing regarding her "maturity."
Third, even if the court conducting the judicial waiver hearing makes
specific findings under both sections 25(d)(1) and 25(d)(2), an adverse
finding with respect to the former does not necessarily reflect on the

165. Id. at *7.
166. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/25(d)(1) (2008).
167. Id. § 25(d)(2).
168. A finding in favor of the minor under either subsection is not appealable. Id. § 25(f).
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minor's "maturity." Instead, without in any way reflecting on the
minor's "maturity," an adverse finding under section 25(d)(1) may
reflect only a doubt on the part of the court that the minor is "well
enough informed to decide intelligently whether to have an abortion."
Fourth, and most importantly, even if the court makes specific
findings on both "maturity" and "best interests," an adverse finding with
respect to the minor's "maturity" under section 25(d)(1) has no bearing
on the minor's ability to consent to an abortion if the court makes a
favorable finding with respect to her "best interests" under section
25(d)(2). Judge Coar assumed that an "immature" minor (a minor for
whom notice was waived under section 25(d)(2), not section 25(d)(1))
lacks authority to consent to an abortion (or at least that her authority to
consent is questionable) and that, as a consequence, she "is left without
recourse, except to obtain consent from her parents, which the court,
169
under these circumstances, has deemed not in her best interest.
Illinois law, however, is directly to the contrary.
Section One of the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act
provides as follows:
Consent by minor. The consent to the performance of a medical or
surgicalprocedure by a physician licensed to practice medicine and
surgery, an advanced practice nurse who has a written collaborative
agreement with a collaborating physician that authorizes provision of
services for minors, or a physician assistant who has been delegated
authority to provide services for minors executed by a married person
who is a minor, by a parent who is a minor, by a pregnant woman who
is a minor, or by any person 18 years of age or older, is not voidable
because of such minority, and, for such purpose, a married person
who is a minor, a parent who is a minor, a pregnant woman who is a
minor, or any person 18 years of age or older, is deemed to have the
has the same powers and obligations
same legal capacity to act and
170
as has a person of legal age.
It is apparent from the emphasized language that a pregnant minor
may consent to the performance "of a medical or surgical procedure" by
a licensed physician, and that her consent "is not voidable because of
[her] minority," and, further, that she "is deemed to have the same legal
capacity to act and has the same powers and obligations as has a person
of legal age." It is (or should be) apparent that, under this statute, a
pregnant minor may consent to an abortion on her own, without the
consent of her parent(s) (or her legal guardian) and without having to
prove her "maturity."
169.
170.

Zbaraz, 2008 WL 589028, at *7.
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/1 (2008) (emphasis added).
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In In re E.G., 1 7 1 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a mature minor
has a limited common law right to refuse life-sustaining medical care,
even though his death would be medically certain. 172 The court
distinguished this common law right from the statutory right afforded
by the predecessor statute to the Consent by Minors to Medical
17 3
Procedures Act. The Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act,
the court explained, "grants minors the legal capacity to consent to
medical treatment in certain situations," including "an individual under
18 who is married or pregnant . ... 174 In referring to minors who
wish to make their own health care decisions, the court held that "[a]
trial judge must determine whether a minor is mature enough to make
health care choices on her own. An exception to this, of course, is if the
legislature has provided otherwise, as in the Consent by Minors to
Medical OperationsAct ....It is evident from In re E.G. that a
pregnant minor may consent to a medical or surgical procedure
(including an abortion) without regard to whether a court has
determined that she is "mature enough to make health care choices on
her own." The same exception is continued in the Consent by Minors to
Medical Procedures Act.
Under the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act, a pregnant
minor has "the same legal capacity to act and ... the same powers and
obligations as .. .a person of legal age." 17 6 If an adult woman ("a
person of legal age") may consent to an abortion, then so may a minor,
regardless of her "maturity" or "immaturity," in the absence of a statute
requiring parental consent (which Illinois has not enacted). The
Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act does not require a
pregnant minor to establish her "maturity" in a court proceeding, nor
does it require her to obtain "authorization" from a court before she may
consent to an abortion. 17 7 Judge Coar neither cited nor discussed the
Consent by Minors to Medical Procedure Act or the Illinois Supreme
Court's opinion in In re E.G. interpreting the predecessor statute.
There is no Illinois case law interpreting section 1 of the Consent by
Minors to Medical Procedures Act with respect to the issue of abortion,
but courts in other states have considered similar statutes in that context.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill.
1990).
Id. at 327-28.
410 ILL. REV. STAT. 210/1-210/5 (1987).
In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325 (emphasis added).
Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/1 (2008).
In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327.
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And, contrary to Judge Coar's assumption, 17 8 other states have
uniformly interpreted comparable language to permit a minor to obtain
179
an abortion without the consent of her parent(s) or guardian(s).
Neither the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 nor any other
Illinois statute limits or qualifies the pregnant minor's authority under
the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act to consent to a
medical or surgical procedure.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that there was no need for the
General Assembly, in enacting a parental notice statute, to "authorize a
method of consent for the abortion."' 180 The pregnant minor already has
that authority under Illinois law. A "best interest" minor for whom
notice has been waived under section 25(d)(2) of the 1995 Act is not
"left without a mechanism to obtain consent for the abortion ...."181
That "mechanism" is section 1 of the Consent by Minors to Medical
Procedures Act. Accordingly, contrary to Judge Coar's holding, 18 2 a
"best interest" minor has not been left in "legal limbo." Once notice has
been waived for either reason ("maturity" or "best interests"), there is
no remaining legal impediment to the minor's ability to obtain an
abortion.
At least four other state parental notice statutes do not contain the
language that Judge Coar thought to be necessary in a parental notice
statute (i.e., language authorizing consent to the abortion, not merely
waiving notice to the parent(s) or legal guardian(s)). 183 All four statutes
are in force. Neither Judge Coar nor the defendants cited any of them.
The Georgia statute was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Planned Parenthood Association of the Atlanta Area v.
Miller.184 In Miller, the plaintiff argued that "physicians [would] be
unwilling to perform abortions even if a constructive order issues (the
178. Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 28, 2008),
rev'd, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009).
179. See, e.g., Ballard v. Anderson, 484 P.2d 1345, 1348-53 (Cal. 1971) (allowing minors to
seek therapeutic abortion without consent of parents); In re Diane, 318 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. Ch.
1974) (choosing, between two directly conflicting statutes, the statute providing that a pregnant
female over twelve could give binding consent); In re Smith, 295 A.2d 238, 245-46 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1972) (stating that "medical treatment" under the minor consent statute encompassed
the termination of pregnancy).
180. Zbaraz, 2008 WL 589028, at *6.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-37.5-107(2)(a) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11114(c)(1), (2) (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(3)(e)(1), (2) (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
65-6705(e) (2002).
184. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of the Atlanta Area v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1479 (11 th Cir.
1991).

Long Road to Justice

2010]

court having failed to act within the statutory time frame) because the
Act does not require the court to confirm in writing that an abortion is
authorized." 185 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, finding
"no constitutional infirmity in this provision of the Georgia Act." 186
Neither Judge Coar nor the plaintiffs cited any authority stating that a
notice statute, as opposed to a consent statute, must empower a court in
a bypass hearing to authorize the minor to consent to an abortion if she
already has that authority under other laws of the State. In Illinois,
under the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act, the pregnant
minor does have that authority, and nothing in the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995 purports to limit her authority. 187 Judge Coar's
holding that the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 is deficient
because it does not authorize a pregnant minor to consent to an abortion
when the circuit court has determined that notification of an "adult
family member" would not be in her "best interests" is erroneous. A
pregnant minor already has that authority under the Consent by Minors
to Medical Procedures Act. Accordingly, in enacting a parental notice
statute, the General Assembly was not required to empower the circuit
court to authorize an abortion for a pregnant minor when parental
notification would not be in her best interests.
VII.

INTERVENTION AND APPEAL

On Tuesday, March 4, 2008, just days after Judge Coar denied the
Attorney General's motion to dissolve the permanent injunction,
Thomas Brejcha, President and Chief Counsel of the Thomas More
Society (which had represented the consortium of organizations
petitioning the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt the judicial bypass
rule(s) in September 2006) contacted Assistant Attorney General
Thomas loppolo to request a meeting with Attorney General Madigan
and her staff. 18 8 The meeting was proposed for the express purpose of
asking the Attorney General to file a motion under Rule 59 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requesting Judge Coar to reconsider
185. Id. at 1477.
186. Id.
187. Even assuming that the foregoing analysis is wrong, an assumption which is compelled
by no legal authority, Judge Coar's reading of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 is
mistaken. Section 25(f) of the Act provides, inter alia, that "[a]n order authorizing an abortion
without notice shall not be subject to appeal." 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 70/25(f) (2006) (last
sentence). Given this language, the only reasonable interpretation of § 25(d) is that a waiver of
notice is, in effect, "[a]n order authorizing an abortion ...." All provisions of a statute must be
read together, and when § 25(d) and § 25(f) are read together, it is apparent that an order waiving
notice is an order "authorizing an abortion without notice ......
188. E-mail from Thomas Brejcha to Thomas Ioppolo (Mar. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
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his ruling denying her motion to dissolve the injunction. 189 The basis of
the Rule 59 motion, as set forth in Mr. Brejcha's communication to Mr.
Ioppolo, was that Judge Coar had overlooked the Consent by Minors to
Medical Procedures Act, which, if brought to his attention, might result
in a different ruling on the merits of the Attorney General's motion to
dissolve the injunction. 190 Mr. Brejcha attached a short memorandum,
which the author of this article had drafted. 19 1 In the penultimate
paragraph of his e-mail, Mr. Brejcha stated that if the Attorney General
elected not to proceed with a Rule 59 motion, then he would seek
"direct participation in the case on behalf of one or more members of
192
the defendant class of State's Attorneys."'
Mr. Brejcha met no success in his effort to arrange a meeting with
Attorney General Madigan and her staff, nor did the Attorney General
agree to file a Rule 59 motion. Accordingly, on March 13, 2008, within
the ten business days allowed by the rule, Mr. Brejcha, along with other
attorneys associated with the Thomas More Society, filed a Rule 59
motion with the district court. 193 The motion was filed on behalf of two
members of the defendant class of Illinois State's Attorneys, Stewart
Umholtz, State's Attorney of Tazewell County, and Edward Deters,
State's Attorney of Effingham County. Along with the Rule 59 motion,
Mr. Brejcha also filed a motion for leave to intervene under Rule 24 on
behalf of the same two State's Attorneys. 194 On the same day (March
13, 2008), which was eighteen days before any notice of appeal had to
be filed, the Attorney General filed her notice of appeal of Judge Coar's
February 28, 2008 ruling.
An extremely abbreviated hearing was held before Judge Coar on
March 20, 2008, on the Rule 59 and Rule 24 motions filed on behalf of
Stewart Umholtz and Edward Deters.
Judge Coar denied both
motions. 19 5 The Rule 59 motion was denied as "procedurally defective"
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The memorandum set forth the analysis of Judge Coar's ruling that appears in Part
VI of this article.
192. Id.
193. Motion To Reconsider, Alter Or Amend The Court's Ruling Of February 28, 2008,
Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028 (N.D. 111.
Mar. 13, 2008) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 59).
194. Motion For Leave To Intervene As Of Right, For Purposes Of Seeking Reconsideration
Of Or Appealing From This Court's Decision Of 2/28/08, In Which It Ruled That Illinois'
Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 Was Fatally Flawed For Lack Of A Consent Provision,
And For Other Relief, Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13,
2008) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 24).
195. Transcript of Proceedings at 3, Zbaraz v. Madigan, No. 84 C 771, 2008 WL 589028
(N.D. 1Il. Mar. 20, 2008).
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because neither Mr. Umholtz nor Mr. Deters had filed an appearance
with the district court or was otherwise "before the court" when it
denied the Attorney General's motion to dissolve the permanent
injunction. 19 6 The Rule 24 motion was denied, Judge Coar explained,
because the district court "lost jurisdiction" of the case once the
Attorney General filed her notice of appeal on March 13, 2008.197
Umholtz and Deters appealed the denial of their two motions, and this
appeal was consolidated with the Attorney General's appeal on the
merits of Judge Coar's ruling on February 28, 2008 that denied her
motion to dissolve the permanent injunction.
In her opening brief on appeal, the Attorney General vigorously
defended the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 and Rule
303A,1 98 as a result of which the plaintiffs abandoned all of the
alternative arguments that they had raised before Judge Coar, including
their argument that the state courts and court staff were not prepared to
administer the statute and the rule. 19 9 The focus of the plaintiffs'
answer brief-and, indeed, the entire appeal-was the interplay
between the parental notice act and the implementing rule on the one
hand and the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act on the
20 0
other.
The key to plaintiffs' analysis was their verbal sleight-of-hand in
treating a finding of "immaturity" in a judicial bypass hearing under the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 as a determination that the
pregnant minor lacks "capacity" (or "legal capacity") to consent to an
abortion. 20 1 But a finding in a bypass hearing that a minor is not
''sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide intelligently
whether to have an abortion," 20 2 cannot be equated in a simplistic
fashion with a finding that the minor lacks "capacity" to consent to an
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id.
198. Pursuant to an order from the court of appeals, which directed the defendants and the
proposed intervenors to coordinate their briefs so as to avoid needless duplication of argument,
representatives of the Thomas More Society, including Mr. Brejcha, President and Chief Counsel,
and the author of this article, acting as Special Counsel for the Society, met with the Solicitor
General and the Deputy Solicitor General to discuss the relative merits of the appeal and the
arguments that should be made on appeal. DuPage County State's Attorney Joseph Birkett and
one of his assistants also attended the meeting at the Attorney General's Office.
199. Plaintiffs' abandonment of their alternative arguments, on the basis of which they could
have defended Judge Coar's order denying defendants' motion to dissolve the injunction, was a
tacit recognition that those arguments had little, if any, basis in law or fact.
200. Corrected Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, Zbaraz v Madigan, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.
2009) (Nos. 08-1620, 08-1782), 2008 WL 5098929.
201. Id. at 20-24.
202. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/25(d) (2008).
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The issue under the
abortion.
Immaturity is not incapacity.
"immaturity" prong of the 1995 Act is not whether the minor is mature
enough to consent to an abortion (which would be the case under a
consent statute), but whether she is mature enough not to notify one of
her parents (or legal guardian) of her decision to obtain an abortion. If
the plaintiffs' analysis of the 1995 Act were correct, a minor whose
judicial bypass petition had been denied would not be able to consent to
an abortion even if she did notify one of her parents (or legal guardian).
The denial of her petition, in plaintiffs' view, would have demonstrated
her lack of capacity to consent to an abortion. Accordingly, a parent (or
legal guardian) would have to consent to the abortion. But, clearly, that
is not what the law requires.
In their brief, plaintiffs did not appear to question that, apart from the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995, pregnant minors may give
effective consent to an abortion under the Consent by Minors to
Medical Procedures Act. Pregnant minors need not obtain the consent
of either parent or anyone else. Nor, in the absence of the 1995 Act,
need they notify a parent or anyone else. That is all changed, under the
plaintiffs' analysis, by virtue of the enactment of the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995. Without expressly saying so, plaintiffs argued,
in effect, that the 1995 Act amended by implication the Consent by
Minors to Medical Procedures Act with respect to minors whose
judicial bypass petitions have been denied or allowed only under the
"best interests" standard. But amendments by implication, like repeals
by implication, are not favored in the law and will not be found absent a
clear and unmistakable conflict between the earlier enacted statute and
the later enacted statute. 20 3 There is no such conflict here, however,
because the earlier statute (the Consent by Minors to Medical
Procedures Act) deals with the authority of pregnant minors (among
others) to consent to medical treatment, while the latter statute (the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995) deals only with notice.
Plaintiffs' analysis of "legal capacity" might be relevant to an abortion
performed upon an "incompetent" person-adult or minor-who,
presumably, lacks capacity to consent to medical or surgical procedures
and would have to be represented by a legal guardian or a guardian ad
litem, but has no relevance to an abortion performed upon "immature"
20 4
minors who have not been adjudicated as "incompetents."
203. People v. Ullrich, 553 N.E.2d 356, 359 (11. 1990) ("[A] statute will not be held to have
implicitly amended an earlier statute unless the terms of the later act are so inconsistent with
those of the prior act that they cannot stand together."); see also Bhd. of Maint. of Way
Employees v. CSX Transp., Inc., 478 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2007) (same).

204. Nothing in the 1995 Act requires the court, in granting a petition for waiver in a judicial
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On July 14, 2009, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
Judge Coar's order, upheld the constitutionality of the 1995 Act and
Rule 303A, and vacated the permanent injunction that had been issued
more than thirteen years earlier when the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to issue the judicial bypass appeal rule(s). "The district court's ruling
that the notice act does not authorize a method of consent for best
interest minors," the court of appeals explained, "appears to rely on the
following chain of argument raised by the plaintiffs below and on
20 5
appeal.,
In what may be an excess of ingenuity, the plaintiffs argue that,
without an express authorization of consent provision, any order
issued by a bypass court waiving parental notice for "best interest"
minors will be ineffective to authorize consent because (1) the court
will necessarily consider a minor's maturity first and only reach the
"best interests" question if it concludes that a minor is too immature to
make the abortion decision on her own; (2) such a finding of
immaturity will necessarily be included in the bypass court's decision
waiving parental notice because the notice act requires the bypass
court to "issue written and specific factual findings and legal
conclusions supporting its decision," section 25(e); and (3) once a
minor has been adjudicated to be immature, she will be unable to
consent to an abortion on her own, because of Illinois' common law
rule requiring informed consent to all medical
procedures: an
20 6
immature minor cannot give informed consent.
"Each link in this chain of argument," the court of appeals found,
"misinterprets the language of the statute and ignores its purpose." 20 7
Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the
statute. 20 8 For the reasons set forth earlier in this article,20 9 the court of
appeals determined first, that, contrary to plaintiffs' argument, the
language and structure of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995
empower Illinois circuit courts to issue orders authorizing consent to an
abortion without notice. 2 10 Second, the court determined that the
language of the 1995 Act does not require the court, in a judicial bypass
bypass hearing, to indicate, in the order itself, on which ground the petition was allowed. See 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 70-25(f) (2008) (last sentence) ("An order authorizing an abortion without
notice shall not be subject to appeal"). Accordingly, a physician who intended to perform an
abortion on a minor who had obtained a waiver of notice would have no basis on which to
question the minor's "capacity" to consent or to "look behind" the order waiving notice.
205. Zbaraz, 572 F.3d at 382-83.
206. Id. at 383.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See discussion supra Part VL
210. Zbaraz, 572 F.3d at 383.
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hearing, to consider the minor's maturity before it considers her best
interests. 211 And, third, the court found that the language of the Act
does not require the circuit court to make 212
findings both with respect to
interests.
best
her
and
maturity
minor's
the
The court of appeals made two other points. Even assuming that "an
213
immature minor cannot give informed consent to her own abortion,"
plaintiffs' argument "still fails." 2 14 The minor will not need to consent
on her own. Even without statutory authorization, the court may issue
an order authorizing consent. The district court held to the contrary that
the statute's bypass provision forecloses this option and that bypass
judges would be hamstrung in their attempts to authorize consent for
immature minors when an abortion without parental notice is in the
minors' best interests. But this is unreasonable. Courts do not need
explicit legislative authorization to issue orders in aid2 15of their own
judgments. That authority inheres in the judicial process.
The court of appeals noted that "[t]his basic principle of common law
is well established in Illinois jurisprudence and does not depend on
express statutory authorization." 216 Accordingly:
if a state bypass court determines that a minor has established one of
the exceptions to the act's notice requirements, i.e., that she is either
mature or that an abortion without notice is in her best interests, the
act requires the court to waive parental notice

. ,

so that the minor

217
may obtain an abortion without telling her parents.
"That the act lacks a provision expressly instructing the court to issue
an order giving effect to its decision does not impair its plain power of
enforcement." 218 After all, the court of appeals asked rhetorically,
"[w]hat would be the point of providing a waiver of notice if there were
no way to enforce it? The act clearly contemplates the court's ability to
follow through on this score, which is well
supported by the common
219
law governing courts' inherent authority.Finally, the court of appeals found that "the district court's
interpretation of the statute ignores its purpose, which is to require

211. Id. at 383-84.
212. Id. at 384.
213. An assumption that, in light of the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act,
discussed above in Part VI, is questionable, as the court of appeals noted. Id. at 384 n. 9.
214. Id. at 384.
215. ld. at 385.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 385-86.
218. id. at 386.

219. Id.
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notice to parents, unless a bypass court waives notification because the
minor is mature or notification is not in her best interests." 2 20 As this
article has previously explained, 2 2 1 "[t]he plaintiffs' interpretation of the
bypass provisions would disallow 'best interest' abortions," which the
court of appeals noted, "squarely contradicts the purpose of the second
half [of] the judicial bypass provision, which is to allow abortions
without notification whenever doing so would be in the minor's best
interests." 22 2 The court determined that the plaintiffs' attempt "to draw
a distinction between an order 'waiving notice' and an order
'authorizing consent to an abortion without notice' .. . is not compelled
by the statute's language and, in fact, [is] nonsensical in the context of
the act's bypass provisions." 22 3 The court refused to "construe a statute
in a way that leads to absurd results." 2 24 Concluding its analysis of the
statute in light of plaintiffs' argument, the court of appeals reiterated
that "the sole purpose of the bypass provisions is to allow the minor to
obtain an abortion without notice; thus, the same court that 'waives
notice' also should 'authorize consent to an abortion without
2 25
notice."'
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Illinois General Assembly's effort to enact an enforceable
parental notice of abortion statute was thwarted for more than twenty
years by the failure (or refusal) of the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt
appropriate rules to implement either the Parental Notice of Abortion
Act of 1983 or the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995, and by the
failure of two Attorneys General to ask the court to adopt such rules.
Neither former Attorney General Jim Ryan, a Republican, nor the
present Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, a Democrat, petitioned the
state supreme court to issue the rules necessary to implement the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 at any time after December
1995, even though, by February 1, 2001, the composition of the court
had changed, replacing a majority of the Justices who had refused to
issue any rules under the 1995 Act.22 6 Following the Illinois Supreme
Court's adoption of Rule 303A on September 20, 2006, Attorney
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
second

Id.
See discussion supra Part VI.
Zbaraz, 572 F.3d at 386 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
As of February 1, 2001, Attorney General Jim Ryan still had almost two years left in his
term.
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General Madigan, who in her first term had never petitioned the court to
issue rule(s) to implement the 1995 Act, waited more than four months
before returning to federal court. Given the relative simplicity of the
issue presented (whether the permanent injunction should be dissolved
following promulgation of Rule 303A), there was no apparent reason
for that delay. Moreover, the stated reasons given by the Attorney
General-the need to engage in "exhaustive research" into the relevant
facts and law-was later contradicted by her Chief-of-Staff's admission
that her office had not really done any research,2 2 7 as well as by
Madigan's failure to submit a memorandum in support of her petition to
dissolve the injunction. There was nothing in her five-page petition that
was not known as of September 20, 2006. Moreover, the Attorney
General's request in January 2007 that the district court appoint a
special master to monitor and report back to Judge Coar on the ability of
state courts and court staff to implement the 1995 Act and Rule 303A
could be viewed as a not too subtle attempt to delay a court hearing on
dissolving the injunction blocking enforcement of the Act. Judge Coar,
as previously noted, rejected this request as unwarranted, unprecedented
and unnecessary. 22 8 It was not until the Illinois Supreme Court had
personally chastised the Attorney General in a telephone call from then
Chief Justice Thomas and in a follow-up letter that she abandoned her
request for a special master and moved Judge Coar to dissolve the
permanent injunction.
The failures of Attorneys General Ryan and Madigan, however, pale
in comparison to the Illinois Supreme Court's abdication of its own
responsibilities. For more than twenty years, both Republican and
Democratic members of the Illinois Supreme Court repeatedly failed to
fulfill their duties under Article VI of the Illinois Constitution to the
People of the State of Illinois by refusing to issue appropriate rule(s) to
implement the parental notice statutes enacted by the state legislature.
The Illinois General Assembly enacted its first parental notice statute
in 1983, which was to take effect on January 1, 1984. The Illinois
Supreme Court waited more than five and one-half years before
adopting the rules necessary to implement the statute and then
promulgated a rule-Rule 307(e)-that was blatantly unconstitutional.
Had the state supreme court promptly adopted appropriate rules
following the enactment of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983,
the State could have begun enforcing the statute by 1989, by which time
the federal litigation over the statute and the implementing rules could
227.
228.

See supra note 106.
See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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have been brought to a successful conclusion. The court compounded
its dereliction of duties when it refused to issue any rules to implement
the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995. The court's after-the-fact
attempt to explain its reasons for doing so was transparently pretextual
and devoid of any legal reasoning or citation of relevant authorities.
The "explanation" offered by Daniel Pascale, the court's administrative
director, displayed a remarkable ignorance of the federal constitutional
principles applicable to judicial bypass hearings and appeals and
overlooked a multitude of state court proceedings that are ex parte,
confidential, or both. It is extraordinary that the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to adopt judicial bypass rules when no other state supreme court
in the country has refused to do so, and when no bypass rules have been
challenged in any court-state or federal--on the grounds raised in
Pascale's letter. Indeed, it was not until Justice Thomas was elected as
Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court that the court finally fulfilled
its constitutional and statutory duties. It is hard to avoid the conclusion
of both the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times that the state
supreme court "deep-sixed" the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of
1995, not on any legal or constitutional grounds, but simply because the
Justices disagreed with the public policy underlying the Act. 229 But
such disagreement has no place in the courts.
Apart from the development of common law principles which, in any
event, is ultimately subject to legislative control, the responsibility for
establishing the State's public policy, regarding abortion or any other
issue, rests with the political branches of state government-the
Governor and the General Assembly-not the judiciary. The belated,
but welcomed, promulgation of Supreme Court Rule 303A, however,
suggests that the Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court have become
sensitive to separation of powers considerations and recognize their
appropriate place in the constitutional structure of governmentinterpreting the state constitution, developing common law principles,
construing state statutes, deciding cases, promulgating court rules, and
exercising oversight over the state courts. 230 Their role does not extend
229. After All, It Is the Law, supra note 95, at § 1, at 24; Editorial, Court Is Out of Line On
Abortion Ruling, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at 33; Editorial, When a Court Presumes to
Legislate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1996, § 1, at 12.
230. Following the submission of this article, the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of
1995 was challenged on state constitutional grounds. See Complaint, Hope Clinic for Women,
Ltd. v. Adams, No. 98 CH 38661 (Cir. Ct., Cook County 2009). On March 29, 2010, the circuit
court of Cook County granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and
dissolved the temporary restraining order that had been issued several months earlier blocking
enforcement of the Act. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, The Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd.
v. Adams, No. 98 CH 3866 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Mar. 29, 2010). The circuit court, however,
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to making (or, in this case, unmaking) the law. The court's interest in
ensuring that other agents of Illinois government-including the
Attorney General, as well as the many circuit court clerks in the Statefulfill their constitutional responsibilities is also welcome. The People
of the State of Illinois will discover, as the people in other states with
enforceable parental notice or consent statutes already have, that an
effective parental involvement law will result in fewer adolescent
pregnancies, abortions and out-of-wedlock births.
That result is
something both sides of the abortion debate should welcome.

stayed the effectiveness of its order pending an appeal by the plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth
in Chapter 16 of the author's book, ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BYSTATE ANALYSIS (Carolina Academic Press 2008), it is unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Court
would hold that the Illinois Consitution confers a right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade.
Accordingly, the parental notice law is likely to go into effect once its constitutionality has been
finally resolved by the state supreme court.
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APPENDIX

A

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS
Daniel Pascale
Administrative Director

160 N. LaSalle Street, Suite N1806
Chicago, IL 60601
Telepbone: (312) 793-8191

December 12,1995

Honorable James Ryan
Attorney General of Illinois
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
13th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Attention: Kathleen K. Flahaven
Assistant Attorney General

Re: Zbaraz v. Ryan, 84 C 771 (N.D.lli)
Dear General:
While the Supreme Court of Illinois is not a party to the litigation referenced
above, the Court is aware of the fact that with the entry of the agreed preliminary
injunction order of June 8, 1995 the case has been stayed, in effect, to afford the
Court an opportunity to promulgate rules as requested by the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995.
The members of the Supreme Court have directed me to advise you, so that
the District Court and the parties to the litigation can promptly be notified, that it is
their decision that no additional rules will be promulgated. Further, by order dated
December 1, 1995, the Court rescinded the existing Rule 307(a)(8) and 307(e) which
was promulgated pursuant to the 1983 Act.
This information is being conveyed to you as the representative of the State of
Illinois. Please advise me if I can provide further information.
Very truly yours,
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B

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS
160 N. LaSalle Street, Suite N1806
Chicago, IL 60601
Telephone: (312) 793-g191

Daniel Pascale
Administrative Diector

Honorable Jim Ryan
Attorney General of Illinois
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
13th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601

January 25, 1996

Attention: Kathleen K. Flahaven
Assistant Attorney General
Re: Zbaraz v. Ryan, 84 C 771 (N.D.llI)
Dear Attorney General Ryan:
During its administrative conference at the November 1995 Term, the Illinois
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the agreed order entered June 8, 1995 by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (District Court) in the
case referenced above. The agreed order "defers any adjudication as to the
constitutionality of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 until the Supreme Court
of Illinois promulgates rules pursuant to Section 25(g) governing appeals from denials
of waiver of parental notice." It also states that the "1995 Act is incomplete and
cannot be adjudicated" until the court promulgates rules. The court had a number of
concerns.
The Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (the Act) provides that no person
may perform an abortion upon a minor or incompetent unless 48-hour actual notice is
given to an adult family member, defined as a parent, grandparent, step parent or
legal guardian. Notice is not required to both parents, nor is the consent of either
required; once the notice is given, after 48 hours the abortion may proceed. If actual
notice is not possible, notice by certified mail to the last known address of the person
entitled to notice must be given.
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The Act permits the minor to petition the circuit court to waive notice to the
defined family member. The circuit court appoints a legal guardian and may also
appoint an attorney for the minor if the minor so requests. The court must rule on the
petition within 48 hours after the petition is filed; failure to rule will automatically waive
the notice requirement If the circuit court grants waiver, no appeal is permitted. If the
court denies waiver of notice, the Act provides for an expedited appeal and the
Supreme Court is "respectfully requested" to promulgate any necessary rules to
ensure expeditious and confidential proceedings.
An earlier enactment in 1983 required 24-hour notice to both parents. It also
called for a "judicial bypass". It was immediately attacked in federal court in Zbaraz v.
Hartigan (84 C 771) and was subsequently enjoined. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to afford the Illinois
Supreme Court an opportunity to promulgate rules ( 763 F.2d 1532 (1985)). The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment by an evenly divided court.
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 484 U.S. 171 (1987)..
Immediately after the governor approved the 1995 Act, on June 8, 1995 at the
request of the attorney general of Illinois and the plaintiff, the District Court entered an
agreed preliminary injunction order in Zbaraz v. Ryan to afford the Illinois Supreme
Court an opportunity to promulgate rules.
The United States Supreme Court decisions concerning these issues which
followed the Seventh Circuit's judgment and the related affirmance by an equally
divided U.S. Supreme Court prohibit restrictions on abortions for minors where
consent is required unless there is also provided some kind of expedited "bypass"
procedure, that is, an opportunity for a third party to waive the consent requirement.
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), involving a
statute which, rather than requiring consent, required 24 hours notice to one of the
woman's parents, the Court observed:
"(allthough our cases have required bypass procedures for parental
consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental notice statutes
must contain such procedures. (citation] We leave the question open,
because, whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice
statutes to contain bypass procedures, (the Ohio statute's] bypass
procedure meets the requirements identified for parental consent
statutes in Danforth, Bellotti, Ashcroft, and Akron. Danforth dstablished
that, in order to prevent another person from having an absolute veto
power over a minor's decision to have an abortion, a State must provide
some sort of bypass procedure if it elects to require parental consent.
[citation] As we hold today in Hodgson v. Minnesota, [497 U.S. 417], it is
a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent statues that a bypass
procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will suffice also for a
notice statute. See also [H.L. v.] Matheson, supra, at 411, n.17, 67
l.Ed.2d 388, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (notice statutes are not equivalent to
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consent statutes because they do not give anyone a veto power over a
minor's abortion decision)."
497 U.S. at 510-11.
And in a related case, decided the same day, Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court stated that
"the requirement that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish
to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the
child, does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest."
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990).
The opinion also states that
"We think it is clear that a requirement that a minor wait 48 hours
after notifying a single parent of her intention to get an abortion would
reasonably further the legitimate state interest in ensuring that the
minor's decision is knowing and intelligent. *The brief waiting period
provides the parent the opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and
a family physician, and it permits the parent to inquire into the
competency of the doctor performing the abortion, discuss the religious
or moral implications of the abortion decision, and provide the daughter
needed guidance and counsel in evaluating the impact of the decision on
her future. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 1552 (CA7 1985)
(Coffey,J., dissenting), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 171"
497 U.S. at 448
Taken together, these cases seem to say that statutes requiring either parental
consent to abortion, or notice to two parents, must include a bypass procedure. The
United States Supreme Court has not considered a single parent notice statute without
a bypass, but the clear implication of Hodgson, above, is that such a statute would be
constitutionally allowed.
The 1995 Illinois statute requires notice only to one adult family member.
Based on the cases cited above, it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court
would find a federal constitutional violation if the statute lacked a bypass. It may be
added that the majority in the Akron case is still active on the Court: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
Of course, the 1995 statute does incorporate a bypass, as did the 1983 statute.
The agreed preliminary injunction again assumes that the Illinois Supreme Court will
enact an expedited appeal procedure. The matter is before the federal court only
because of a federal question; because of the questions already decided in prior
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cases referred to above, there is a federal question here only ifa bypass is required.
If it is not required, then the issue of whether there are appeal rules is only a state
issue and thus, for federal jurisdiction purposes, irrelevant.
There is a related issue which needs consideration. The District Court's
memorandum opinion declares that an adversary proceeding would not be consistent
with the purpose or nature of the hearing. In effect, the District Court requires an ex
parte hearing, for
"If the proceedings are effectively confidential as they must be, no
respondent could possibly appear in the case. The only persons having
knowledge of the woman's appeal should properly be any guardian ad
litem or attorney appointed to assist her and the judge--none of whom
can be a 'respondent'."
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 776 F. Supp. 375, 383 (N.D. III. 1991).
But the United States Supreme Court has never decided that the proceeding
must be ex parte, secret and exempt from the claims of the first amendment. While
the Ohio statute considered in the Akron case did contemplate an ex parte hearing, no
one questioned it as an impermissible departure from standard concerns of
justiciability.
The District Court's language is rather surprising from an Article Ill judge,
because it sanctions a non-adversary proceeding. The courts of Illinois, like the
federal courts, sit to decide "cases or controversies". This being so, it seems
necessarily to imply a respondent and some kind of adversary proceeding. Otherwise,
the court does not appear to be carrying out a judicial function. If the only persons
having knowledge of the minor's appeal can be the guardian or attorney and the
judge, one wonders what there is for the appellate court to do when the record is
simply the pleading and the lower court's findings.
In sum, the General Assembly's request to this Court seems to be the result of
an excess of caution. However, it is noteworthy that United States Supreme Court
decisions do not mandate a "judicial" bypass, only that, where consent or notice to
both parents is required, "some sort of bypass procedure' must be available. If the
General Assembly were to conclude that even in a one-adult-family-member notice
statute there should be some sort of review, nothing would preclude it from
establishing or designating an administrative agency to perform what is clearly a nonjudicial function.
The 1995 Act includes a severability provision and the constitutionality of the
statute may be determined without a "judicial bypass", based on the cases cited
above. If your office chooses not to defend the Act without appellate rules, or if the
federal courts determine that the United States Constitution does require a bypass
even in the context of the 1995 Act, the General Assembly can take appropriate steps
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to provide administrative evaluation of the maturity of pregnant minors to avoid
informing a parent.
If I can be of assistance, please call me.
Very truly yours,

cc:

Hon. Paul E. Plunkett
Hon. Jim Edgar
Hon. James "Pate* Philip
Hon. Lee Daniels
Hon. Michael J. Madigan
Hon. Emil Jones
Marc Oliver Beem, Esq.
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February 27, 2007

Honorable Lisa. M. Madigan
Illinois Attorney General
500 S. Second Street
Springfield; Illinois 62706
Dear Attorney General Madigan:
At the reluest of the full Court, Chief Justice Thomas expressed to you our concerns regarding
by your office in the Zbaraz matter. This letter, offered as followassertions made in the petition filed
up. summarizes the substance of theCourt's full
discussion of this matter.
Representations made by the Illinois Attorney General's Office to Judge David Coar to the efflect that
the circuit and appellate courts of Illinois were not administratively prepared to proceed in adjudicating
matters brought pursuant to the Parental Notification Act were in error. The Illinois Supreme Court.
having adopted Supreme Court Rule 303A, is in compliance with section "g"of theParental
Notification Act. We presume, and therefore assert that, as with the enactment of any new law. our
state courts are prepared to proceed to apply the law as enacted.
Respectfully,

Robert R.Thomas

A B.

arman

Justices
Supreme Court of llfinois

Charles

Thma R.Ftgrad

Lloyd A. Karmeier

Anne M. Burke
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